Some fun stuff:
A recent Strong Towns post tells us that (1) sales taxes are increasingly being used as DOT slush funds (due to excessive restrictions on local tax collection),
while (2) this table suggests there is a mighty overhang in retail in this country (made worse by the fact that such counts routinely undercount antifragile retail),
thereby (3) heading into the teeth of a likely large-scale retail downsizing,
which would (4) extirpate sales tax revenues in most locations--shrinking the size footprint of the transportation slush fund.
This is consistent with "tail fattening" (think Nassim Taleb)--especially the kind that, to reduce or mitigate risk now, kicks it down the road, compounding it when the interest's due.
The only real long-term solution is--as I have said before and I will say again--conversion to a user fees-based system for access-managed roads, and massive reductions in maintained infrastructure for all general-access byways.
Showing posts with label Retail. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Retail. Show all posts
Wednesday, January 29, 2014
Tuesday, January 21, 2014
On Retail
Saw this at Zero Hedge.
Keep in mind the deep structural fragilities of the average four-anchor regional mall. There's the fragility resulting from the slow decline of the middle class, and this is what blogs like Zero Hedge focus on.
Then there's also a management fragility, a fragility that stems from the very design of the mall: To be healthy, it is dependent on the health of all four anchors. Mall dead zones are intensely correlated with closed (or "dead") anchors. Since the beginning of the '90s, there were basically five different entities that would anchor a mall:
The problem is that the four-anchor model matured just before this contraction: When malls such as Montgomery Mall, Neshaminy Mall, Oxford Valley Mall, Christiana Mall etc. were designed, REITs (mall developers) usually had a buffet of six or more potential anchors to court. A four-anchor mall was a nice tradeoff between mall developers and the anchors themselves, none of which would need to be in every mall to achieve market saturation. Failures such as Dixie Square in this environment were rare and more linked to demographic misprediction.
But the so-far culmination of the contraction in the 2005-6 Federated-May merger resulted in further anchor erosion, such that four-anchor malls could court only four anchors:
Either the collapse of Sears or J.C. Penney would catalyze the exponential growth of dead malls, a point Zero Hedge makes, largely because it would collapse the available anchor list for most malls from four to three (and keep in mind that hypermarkets e.g. Target generally make poor anchor candidates, as they're usually co-located in the same strip, just down the road), thereby creating large dead sections in most malls--and exacerbating dead sections of malls that still have dead sections left over from 2006. In fact, for the latter case, such a collapse spells a death knell, as, once a mall drops below a certain occupancy threshold, it generates inadequate rents to be self-sustaining.
A further issue is that more profitable malls currently cross-subsidize less profitable ones. This is why malls that obviously take massive hits on facilities maintenance, such as many of those featured on Dead Malls, can afford to stay open until Claire's, Gamestop, and Radio Shack are the only tenants left. Just the collapse of Sears or J.C. Penney harms the mall model overall, because the cross-subsidizer loses one of its major income centers (the wing it anchored), in turn reducing the internal cash flow to the subsidized dying/dead mall, forcing more dead malls to close etc.
Just the collapse of Sears or J.C. Penney makes the mall financially fragile.
The collapse of both wipes out whole wings, or halves, or--for malls still dealing with a 2006 anchor loss--more, of leased leasable space in 99% of all malls. Even the most financially robust malls see their balance sheets shrink to breakeven. Already dying malls are discharged. And for the typical challenged, already breakeven anchor mall, there is no white knight, no cross-subsidizer left. Only a truly slim subclass of malls--those with carriage trade anchors*--could possibly emerge from this for the better.
The net result would be a ripple contraction throughout the retail sector, as REITs merge to survive; inline stores contract locations and staff as they clear out of dying malls; and who-knows-what other consequences fall out of the vicious cycle.
Why does this matter? Aren't malls obsolete anyway?
To answer the second question first: Yes and no. Yes, the regional mall is an obsolete business model, but no, it's not online retail or lifestyle centers driving them out of business. For the former, I like to say that Amazon is to us what the Sears catalog was to people living in the 1900s: that is, remarkably convenient, but not convenient enough to trump the bricks-and-mortar shopping experience. The numbers bear this out (Zero Hedge ibid.). And for the latter, lifestyle centers are just newer shinier malls, very occasionally with a prototype infrastructure of resiliency in them.
The thing that is really killing the mall is the return to relevancy of the very thing it displaced.
For the former question, this matters because--nearly all job growth in the last decade (or more) in any sector that doesn't require mastery of calculus has been in retail sales. And in most suburban markets, the highest job densities in this sector, after revitalizing Main Streets, are--in regional shopping malls. Just as the traditional setup cross-fertilized sales, so too did it jobs. Lifestyle centers replicate this to some extent, and hypermarket-driven power centers don't hold a candle. Of course, nearly all non-Main Street retail offers little more than servitor jobs, but even so...
The implication is clear. Concomitant collapse of Sears and J.C. Penney brings the mall to its knees. In doing so, it catalyzes the downsizing of almost every inline chain, as they scramble to locate or relocate to the remaining profitable malls. And in doing so, it catalyzes a major percentage cut in the retail jobs numbers. This, in turn, negatively affects mall patronization**, further weakening the remaining malls, further catalyzing consolidation, causing yet more cuts etc. in a vicious cycle. And of course, since retail jobs have been the only positive fudge for economists, a sector collapse would lead to significant wider economic implications.
The large-scale arc appears to be: The return of the (antifragile) entrepreneur, the Main Street retailer, and the failure of the (fragile) nationalized franchised chains. Bricks-and-mortar is resetting. But the path there will be ugly.
_____________
* I.e. Barney's, Bloomingdales, Lord & Taylor, Neiman Marcus, Nordstrom, Saks Fifth Avenue, and a handful of regionals or one-offs such as Von Maur.
** Among other things, such as further stressing a stressed welfare state.
Keep in mind the deep structural fragilities of the average four-anchor regional mall. There's the fragility resulting from the slow decline of the middle class, and this is what blogs like Zero Hedge focus on.
Then there's also a management fragility, a fragility that stems from the very design of the mall: To be healthy, it is dependent on the health of all four anchors. Mall dead zones are intensely correlated with closed (or "dead") anchors. Since the beginning of the '90s, there were basically five different entities that would anchor a mall:
- Sears
- J.C. Penney
- Federated (Macy's)
- May (Strawbridge's, Hecht's, Filene's, Kaufmann's, Marshall Field, etc.)
- Regional chains (Boscov's, Dillard's, Belk, Northern {Bon-Ton, Carson Pirie Scott, etc.})
The problem is that the four-anchor model matured just before this contraction: When malls such as Montgomery Mall, Neshaminy Mall, Oxford Valley Mall, Christiana Mall etc. were designed, REITs (mall developers) usually had a buffet of six or more potential anchors to court. A four-anchor mall was a nice tradeoff between mall developers and the anchors themselves, none of which would need to be in every mall to achieve market saturation. Failures such as Dixie Square in this environment were rare and more linked to demographic misprediction.
But the so-far culmination of the contraction in the 2005-6 Federated-May merger resulted in further anchor erosion, such that four-anchor malls could court only four anchors:
- Sears
- J.C. Penney
- Macy's
- Regionals
Either the collapse of Sears or J.C. Penney would catalyze the exponential growth of dead malls, a point Zero Hedge makes, largely because it would collapse the available anchor list for most malls from four to three (and keep in mind that hypermarkets e.g. Target generally make poor anchor candidates, as they're usually co-located in the same strip, just down the road), thereby creating large dead sections in most malls--and exacerbating dead sections of malls that still have dead sections left over from 2006. In fact, for the latter case, such a collapse spells a death knell, as, once a mall drops below a certain occupancy threshold, it generates inadequate rents to be self-sustaining.
A further issue is that more profitable malls currently cross-subsidize less profitable ones. This is why malls that obviously take massive hits on facilities maintenance, such as many of those featured on Dead Malls, can afford to stay open until Claire's, Gamestop, and Radio Shack are the only tenants left. Just the collapse of Sears or J.C. Penney harms the mall model overall, because the cross-subsidizer loses one of its major income centers (the wing it anchored), in turn reducing the internal cash flow to the subsidized dying/dead mall, forcing more dead malls to close etc.
Just the collapse of Sears or J.C. Penney makes the mall financially fragile.
The collapse of both wipes out whole wings, or halves, or--for malls still dealing with a 2006 anchor loss--more, of leased leasable space in 99% of all malls. Even the most financially robust malls see their balance sheets shrink to breakeven. Already dying malls are discharged. And for the typical challenged, already breakeven anchor mall, there is no white knight, no cross-subsidizer left. Only a truly slim subclass of malls--those with carriage trade anchors*--could possibly emerge from this for the better.
The net result would be a ripple contraction throughout the retail sector, as REITs merge to survive; inline stores contract locations and staff as they clear out of dying malls; and who-knows-what other consequences fall out of the vicious cycle.
Why does this matter? Aren't malls obsolete anyway?
To answer the second question first: Yes and no. Yes, the regional mall is an obsolete business model, but no, it's not online retail or lifestyle centers driving them out of business. For the former, I like to say that Amazon is to us what the Sears catalog was to people living in the 1900s: that is, remarkably convenient, but not convenient enough to trump the bricks-and-mortar shopping experience. The numbers bear this out (Zero Hedge ibid.). And for the latter, lifestyle centers are just newer shinier malls, very occasionally with a prototype infrastructure of resiliency in them.
The thing that is really killing the mall is the return to relevancy of the very thing it displaced.
For the former question, this matters because--nearly all job growth in the last decade (or more) in any sector that doesn't require mastery of calculus has been in retail sales. And in most suburban markets, the highest job densities in this sector, after revitalizing Main Streets, are--in regional shopping malls. Just as the traditional setup cross-fertilized sales, so too did it jobs. Lifestyle centers replicate this to some extent, and hypermarket-driven power centers don't hold a candle. Of course, nearly all non-Main Street retail offers little more than servitor jobs, but even so...
The implication is clear. Concomitant collapse of Sears and J.C. Penney brings the mall to its knees. In doing so, it catalyzes the downsizing of almost every inline chain, as they scramble to locate or relocate to the remaining profitable malls. And in doing so, it catalyzes a major percentage cut in the retail jobs numbers. This, in turn, negatively affects mall patronization**, further weakening the remaining malls, further catalyzing consolidation, causing yet more cuts etc. in a vicious cycle. And of course, since retail jobs have been the only positive fudge for economists, a sector collapse would lead to significant wider economic implications.
The large-scale arc appears to be: The return of the (antifragile) entrepreneur, the Main Street retailer, and the failure of the (fragile) nationalized franchised chains. Bricks-and-mortar is resetting. But the path there will be ugly.
_____________
* I.e. Barney's, Bloomingdales, Lord & Taylor, Neiman Marcus, Nordstrom, Saks Fifth Avenue, and a handful of regionals or one-offs such as Von Maur.
** Among other things, such as further stressing a stressed welfare state.
Saturday, December 14, 2013
Franklin Flea
| Franklin Flea |
| The elevator hall |
| The Food Hall, with purdy fixtures |
| The Food Hall in Strawbridge's' last days |
So it appears that the there are three remaining halls and change off the store's central hallway (leading through the elevator lobby). If we assume that Eataly will get the Food Hall, as seems increasingly likely, this means that the rear portion of the 1800s structure, whatever remains of its forward part, and the entrance hall would be in play. The size of the older halls makes them ideal for inline stores, so let us focus on the entrance hall.
| Scope of the entrance hall |
Seeking an anchor
Perhaps the trickiest part of this endeavor is engineering ways to ensure that the entrance hall remains internally linked to the basement and second floor. My position is that until and unless we have a clear tenancy plan that would fill both parts, we should not--cannot--sacrifice these internal linkages. This implies that if (when) Eataly fills the Food Hall, we should seek a plan that links the entrance hall and the elevator hall together. But of course such a plan would cut the Food Hall off from its historical main entrance, in front of the boar. And it's entirely possible the Food Hall isn't as large as I think it is.
| Another look at the entrance hall, from its SW corner. |
- Barney's New York
- Bloomingdale's
- Lord & Taylor
- Neiman Marcus
- Nordstrom
- Saks Fifth Avenue
- Von Maur
___________________________
* BTW if anybody knows whatever happened to the original Food Hall fixtures, could there be any way of bringing them back for Eataly? 'Cause those look pretty darned cool.
** The fact that Bloomie's passed up on the Daffy's space (1700 Chestnut) because it's "too small" does not sound like an outlet concept to me. Outlets, like Saks Off 5th, Last Call Neiman Marcus, and eventual Daffy's lessee Nordstrom Rack are typically ~30k sf.
Friday, September 28, 2012
Circuitous and Serpentine
With the recent announcement that they are acquiring 901 Market from Vornado (a New York landlord's only significant Philadelphia holding) for $60m, PREIT has finally completed the onerous task of assembling the Gallery complex into a single ownership structure. To do this, they have had to acquire the former Strawbridge's and to make peace with the City and the RDA. And this had to be done before any significant modernization effort could get underway.
All this time, the Gallery has been declining; I documented its effects last fall. After withstanding the 1980s urban retail exodus, the first chink in its armor was cut in 1989, when Stern's (having replaced Gimbels) pulled out and the space was restructured for Clover and more office space. This became a new equilibrium through the 1990s (similarly-placed Kmart replaced Clover in the space) until 2006, when Macy's closed the flagship Strawbridge's, moving their operations to the Wanamaker Building, in a space that remains significantly undersized relative to shoppers' needs. Note to Macy's: Don't try to cram yourself into a Lord & Taylor space, it just doesn't work.
After 2006, the Gallery's fortunes accelerated on their downward track. Without Strawbridge's to anchor it, the east wing failed; the west wing has remained significantly stronger, but still weak. The profit margin-poor food courts have become the leading customer draw, further isolating activity on the concourse. Nearly all the Strawbridge's space has been turned into offices--State and City offices. And hotel guests at the Loews, Marriot, and Hilton Garden right next door are bussed to King of Prussia as the Gallery further weakens.
Two more announcements: (1) PREIT is planning on pumping $300m into the Gallery, totally repositioning it, and (2) Kmart is not renewing its lease.
This is good news! The Kmart space has long split the Gallery into two separate wings, and half the office space sits unused. Meanwhile, the Gallery is the key to Market East, and strengthening it will also strengthen the corridor.
What PREIT exactly has up its sleeve is still a mystery, but I would like to present my optimal Gallery redesign, based on a modification of the Westfield San Francisco Centre layout optimized for the much more linear Gallery corridor. Westfield, where they undertook a $440m renovation in 2006 completely replacing the interior of the former Emporium department store, also functions as a model for PREIT going forward.
In this model, I have retained three anchor spaces. The basement and first floor of Strawbridge's is one anchor space; the 2nd, 3rd, and half the 4th floors of the Gimbels the second, and the extant Burlington Coat Factory the third. In a nod to Chicago's former Carson, Pirie, Scott, I have placed City Target in the remnants of the Strawbridge's space; a Century21 is placed in the Gimbels space, becoming the complex's dominant anchor. A multiplex uses east wing third floor space, while the main food court is relocated to Strawbridge's atrium, the kitchen spaces along the party wall between the Gallery and the original Strawbridge's on the second floor. Cross-floor access is revamped, with the multiplex's main entrance being along the corridor leading to Gallery I's parking garage, and a secondary entrance being from the food court's new "Dining Porch"; the third floor on the bridge across 9th will be eliminated.
The large spaces left behind on the first floor will be subdivided as need be, with an optimal mix mixing medium-size "big boxes" (e.g. Toys "Я" Us, Barnes & Noble, Bed Bath & Beyond, etc.) and inline stores. The goal of this project is to attract budget fashion retail (Forever 21, H&M, Hollister, Aeropostale...) to the upper inline levels, while having casual eateries and at least one secondary anchor face the street. Redevelopment here will complement Girard Square, although the large anchor space in the latter complex does not currently have a tenant.
Finally, a major element of any Gallery project is to activate the three built-in pads. As Hilton now has two nameplates in proximity (Home2, Hilton Garden), I recommend a Hilton proper on the 1001 Market pad site, and rental apartments on the 1000 Filbert; currently, however, there is no good use for the east wing pad site.
Remember above all that the success of the Gallery, both internally and as cityscape, is crucial to the success of Market East as a whole. To make Market East a place people want to go to, the Gallery must be a place people want to go to; to see development on the un- and underbuilt parcels on Market East, Market East must be a place people want to go to.
All this time, the Gallery has been declining; I documented its effects last fall. After withstanding the 1980s urban retail exodus, the first chink in its armor was cut in 1989, when Stern's (having replaced Gimbels) pulled out and the space was restructured for Clover and more office space. This became a new equilibrium through the 1990s (similarly-placed Kmart replaced Clover in the space) until 2006, when Macy's closed the flagship Strawbridge's, moving their operations to the Wanamaker Building, in a space that remains significantly undersized relative to shoppers' needs. Note to Macy's: Don't try to cram yourself into a Lord & Taylor space, it just doesn't work.
After 2006, the Gallery's fortunes accelerated on their downward track. Without Strawbridge's to anchor it, the east wing failed; the west wing has remained significantly stronger, but still weak. The profit margin-poor food courts have become the leading customer draw, further isolating activity on the concourse. Nearly all the Strawbridge's space has been turned into offices--State and City offices. And hotel guests at the Loews, Marriot, and Hilton Garden right next door are bussed to King of Prussia as the Gallery further weakens.
Two more announcements: (1) PREIT is planning on pumping $300m into the Gallery, totally repositioning it, and (2) Kmart is not renewing its lease.
This is good news! The Kmart space has long split the Gallery into two separate wings, and half the office space sits unused. Meanwhile, the Gallery is the key to Market East, and strengthening it will also strengthen the corridor.
What PREIT exactly has up its sleeve is still a mystery, but I would like to present my optimal Gallery redesign, based on a modification of the Westfield San Francisco Centre layout optimized for the much more linear Gallery corridor. Westfield, where they undertook a $440m renovation in 2006 completely replacing the interior of the former Emporium department store, also functions as a model for PREIT going forward.
![]() |
| Pink is offices, sky blue inline retail, blue anchors; orange the multiplex, yellow the food court. Brown is Market East's platform level. |
The large spaces left behind on the first floor will be subdivided as need be, with an optimal mix mixing medium-size "big boxes" (e.g. Toys "Я" Us, Barnes & Noble, Bed Bath & Beyond, etc.) and inline stores. The goal of this project is to attract budget fashion retail (Forever 21, H&M, Hollister, Aeropostale...) to the upper inline levels, while having casual eateries and at least one secondary anchor face the street. Redevelopment here will complement Girard Square, although the large anchor space in the latter complex does not currently have a tenant.
Finally, a major element of any Gallery project is to activate the three built-in pads. As Hilton now has two nameplates in proximity (Home2, Hilton Garden), I recommend a Hilton proper on the 1001 Market pad site, and rental apartments on the 1000 Filbert; currently, however, there is no good use for the east wing pad site.
Remember above all that the success of the Gallery, both internally and as cityscape, is crucial to the success of Market East as a whole. To make Market East a place people want to go to, the Gallery must be a place people want to go to; to see development on the un- and underbuilt parcels on Market East, Market East must be a place people want to go to.
Monday, November 21, 2011
Decline and Decay; Planning for Revitalization on Market East
| Strawbridge's in better times. Courtesy Labelscar. |
| 8th & Market back when it was bordered by half of the city's major department stores. Courtesy the Hagley Archives. |
| The Gallery in its prime: Black Friday, 1980. Source: Temple University Urban Archives |
| Redevelopment is badly needed at the Gallery. This is the panorama one is treated to from Burlington Coat Factory's 3rd floor entrance. |
| Kmart's Gallery II entrance. The shut, mural-clad third floor entrance (closed off ca. 1990) leads to converted--and vacant--office space. Reactivating it for retail may be a possibility. |
| Taken from the upper Kmart entrance to Gallery I. Vacancy and marginal stores rule the roost on the upper floors. The largest storefront--"How Philly Moves"--is a public mural studio. |
| An entrance never again to be used by retail. |
| The new Mural Arts visitor center/store--the lone new addition in this part of the Gallery. |
| Vacancies around the former Strawbridge's. |
| Too many vacancies to be good... |
| The Wet Seal that is--unbelievably--still holding on. |
| At the Gallery--we accept food stamps. Is there any better a symbol for hard times? |
- Conversion of the entire site into a single anchor.
- Conversion of part of the site into a main anchor, and the remainder into a sub-anchor.
- Conversion of the great hall into a mall sub-court, e.g. the Pavilion at King of Prussia, flanked by basement and second story sub-anchors.
| The Black Friday view from higher in the post--today. |
| Mural Arts installs one of the first major examples of large signage on Market East. Another is 801 Market's leasing signs. Are any ads up on 1234 Market? |
| Underutilized space in the Reading Terminal Headhouse. |
| Bland blank walls fill this lower atrium. A service door, out of sight left, may be all that's left of a former subway access path. |
Westfield San Francisco is stacked on top of inline stores) or perhaps Westfield's own solution. Another key to this structure is how the fifth floor is used--this is the space currently filled by the methadone clinic (a very marginal use, by the way); it could be offices (Gallery offices? doctors' offices?), storage, a third floor of an upper anchor (either paired with a lower anchor, or with the current anchor floors converted to inline mall space, preferably with a new atrium hollowed out)--but all this assumes a retail conversion of the top half of the structure. What if an office tenant is found instead?
| Closeup of the sign. |
| Filbert behind the Gallery. No fewer than three large parking garages, and a very low-slung bus terminal. Moving the bus terminal to a space off of the Gallery's service drive was an idea kicked around in the most recent Market East plan, filled with generally good ideas despite (or perhaps because of?) its being kludged together when Foxwoods-to-the-Gallery seemed imminent. If this is done, however, access to the bus bays from likely waiting areas becomes a major problem. On the plus side, it also opens up land the current depot sits on for development. |
____________
* Stern's seems to have snapped the Gimbels lease right up.
** Had this happened, it is likely that the former Gimbels (whose retail space was curtailed to its bottom three floors, two of which were occupied by Clover and later Kmart, ca. 1990) would have either (a) been converted into a Men's or Furniture store (there are examples of both), or (b) lain vacant much as Strawbridge's has for the past five years.
*** This also makes Bon-Ton's shedding of its (historic) Carson's and Younker's downtown locations seem particularly short-sighted. Bon-Ton did develop a bad habit of vacating the downtown stores it acquired, starting(?) with Allentown's Hess's.
^ Which is partly why I helped found, and continue to maintain, the Concerned Citizens for Market East. The sign bill offered a useful instrument for reinvestment, and the policy line being held by SCRUB was definitely not going to do the job. Indeed, over the past two years they had made themselves look silly by protesting what was entirely reasonable large signage at 1234 Market and on the Thomas Lofts' party wall.
Thursday, July 21, 2011
Death of a Retailer
The bankrupt bookstore, Borders, announced a couple of days ago that it will liquidate its remaining assets, after a deal with the Najafi Companies fell through. Borders was the second-largest bookstore chain in the U.S., after Barnes & Noble, with a presence in most of our larger cities and urban areas. (The third largest, Books-A-Million, is a long way behind, with locations primarily in the Southeast and a brand that lacks, um, gravitas.)
A lot of people, me included, grew up browsing the local library, Borders, and Barnes & Noble, picking something off the shelf that looked interesting, and learning about topics as disparate as high literature, philosophy, and cosmology. More so than any other bookstore, Borders was a place where you could just plop down and read and sometimes even doze. While that might have been a problem, in terms of business-model sustainability, it certainly made Borders feel like the center of a community--a private but publicly available information repository.
I grew up with Borders. My mom worked next to one, so whenever I had to wait for her I waited there. Whenever I found myself having to wait in Center City, I waited at the Borders at Broad and Chestnut. Most of the books I bought, I bought from Borders. They were always my favorite bookstore--the first one opening up in my area had been a revelation. I've never really felt at home in Barnes & Noble's stacks; I'll miss Borders.
So what's next? A big push by Books-A-Million? The company is far too small to compete with B&N--and even then B&N hasn't been having a good year? What about Amazon deciding to maintain a physical presence alongside a Web presence? (Its market is the descendant of mail-order, after all, and it would be following in the footsteps of brands such as Sears and Montgomery Ward.) American expansion by the Canadian chains Indigo and Chapters? (Kobo, because of Borders, certainly has some American presence.) Or of European and Oceanic firms, such as Waterstone's, W.H. Smith, fnac, Weltbild, Angus & Robertson, or some other established chain? Or a contraction of the publication industry in general? (I hope it's not that, I want people to read.) But there's the rub--despite the doom-and-gloom claims that Borders went bankrupt because its core business model wasn't sustainable (especially in wake of Amazon), the fact that so many other companies are successful in their fields, coupled with bad business decisions Borders made (most especially its early-2000s partnership with Amazon, which really served to poach Borders' customers), and the destabilizing effect of the recession, was more what brought the store down. The need to browse is human, and these big chain bookstores are consequently always stuffed with browsers. Browsing leads to impulse purchases: this creates a market bricks-and-mortar retailers can capitalize on thatmail-order catalogs Internet retailers can't. This is why firms such as Sears and Ward's made the leap from the catalog to the showroom and physical store--and why the physical store will never die: because the psychology of the shopper changes subtly from the catalog (or website) to the physical store: the site feels more like a wish list ("what if?") while the store feels more concrete, more there, and easier to think about getting. Impulse purchases on Amazon are unlikely; at Barnes & Noble, they're a certainty.
A lot of people, me included, grew up browsing the local library, Borders, and Barnes & Noble, picking something off the shelf that looked interesting, and learning about topics as disparate as high literature, philosophy, and cosmology. More so than any other bookstore, Borders was a place where you could just plop down and read and sometimes even doze. While that might have been a problem, in terms of business-model sustainability, it certainly made Borders feel like the center of a community--a private but publicly available information repository.
I grew up with Borders. My mom worked next to one, so whenever I had to wait for her I waited there. Whenever I found myself having to wait in Center City, I waited at the Borders at Broad and Chestnut. Most of the books I bought, I bought from Borders. They were always my favorite bookstore--the first one opening up in my area had been a revelation. I've never really felt at home in Barnes & Noble's stacks; I'll miss Borders.
So what's next? A big push by Books-A-Million? The company is far too small to compete with B&N--and even then B&N hasn't been having a good year? What about Amazon deciding to maintain a physical presence alongside a Web presence? (Its market is the descendant of mail-order, after all, and it would be following in the footsteps of brands such as Sears and Montgomery Ward.) American expansion by the Canadian chains Indigo and Chapters? (Kobo, because of Borders, certainly has some American presence.) Or of European and Oceanic firms, such as Waterstone's, W.H. Smith, fnac, Weltbild, Angus & Robertson, or some other established chain? Or a contraction of the publication industry in general? (I hope it's not that, I want people to read.) But there's the rub--despite the doom-and-gloom claims that Borders went bankrupt because its core business model wasn't sustainable (especially in wake of Amazon), the fact that so many other companies are successful in their fields, coupled with bad business decisions Borders made (most especially its early-2000s partnership with Amazon, which really served to poach Borders' customers), and the destabilizing effect of the recession, was more what brought the store down. The need to browse is human, and these big chain bookstores are consequently always stuffed with browsers. Browsing leads to impulse purchases: this creates a market bricks-and-mortar retailers can capitalize on that
Wednesday, June 8, 2011
Say My Name
Any publicity is good publicity, they say. CCME got face time in the Daily News today. Check it out:
Temple student Stephen Stofka, who started the Facebook group Concerned Citizens for Market East, said that there's almost no signage on Market East now, at least none that you can see from Independence Mall.Ain't that nice?
"There's an invisible wall here," he said at 6th and Market. "Why would anyone walk up there? It looks boring."
Stofka walked around Market East and The Gallery for an hour one recent day with the Daily News, unable to hide his concern.
"It's not rocket science to know that this parking lot shouldn't be here - it's taking up valuable land," he said, pointing to a street-level lot at 8th and Market, also known as "The Disney Hole." (Disney's plans for an indoor amusement park at the site failed.)
The Goldenberg Group owns two acres on Market between 8th and 9th. Senior partner Robert W. Freedman said in a statement that the company is "continually analyzing retail, hotel, entertainment and office uses to sculpt a dynamic mixed-use project that will add vitality to Market Street East."
Market East
I spent most of the day today (technically yesterday) at the Council meeting discussing the large signage bill on Market East.
I am in support of this bill because (a) legalizing any and all funding sources should provide stronger development financing and leveraging, (b) the outside of the Gallery looks like crap, and (c) it's in keeping with Market East's historic character.
Which is why I find the "historic" argument by the opposition so ironic and hilarious. Each opposition group repeats the same claim: Market East is a historic district. It is not. It is a smattering of historic buildings (Lits, Strawbridge's, Wanamakers, Reading Terminal, PSFS, etc.) in a fabric largely rebuilt between 1950 and 1980. The (lack of) density of the historic buildings doesn't merit historic district consideration. And furthermore, since so many of these buildings were built with retail in mind, they sported large signs from the very beginning. Robbing them of their signs robs them of their real historic nature and creates a false history, one in keeping with a mentality that the only things in Philadelphia worth keeping were built before 1800.
Market East's history is one of a retail and commercial heart of a city. It is like Boston's Downtown Crossing, New York's Herald Square, Toronto's Dundas Square, San Francisco's Union Square, Chicago's Historic Loop, Minneapolis' Nicollet Mall, London's Piccadilly Circus and Regent Street, and hundreds of other examples globally. Such centers have always been populated as signs as big and fancy as then-current technology allowed. To say otherwise countermands their history.
It is thus unsurprising that the most satisfying intersections on Market East are at 12th and 13th (especially when 1234 had that Dunkin' Donuts billboard in). This is because they are activated, and part of their activation is their signage. The Hard Rock guitar, an incised Marriot sign, the signs for Sole Food and Loews Hotel, the Convention Center, Macy's' display windows...all of this results in the skeleton of some reasonably lively corners. By Market East standards, they're positively tripping.
We must not distract from pedestrian amenities (or their lack thereof). But most the historic assets of Market East have been redeveloped, and further redevelopment needs to happen now on the multitude of underutilized properties (650 Market, the Disney Hole, 910-50 Market, 1000 and 1100 blocks of Market, 1301 Market...) that surround and besiege the historic properties. And to do that as many funding sources as possible must be tapped. Philadelphia's sign ordinance is, when enforced, among the most restrictive in the country. Maybe it's time to concede that, in Market East's case, it's too restrictive, and needs to be relaxed.
I am in support of this bill because (a) legalizing any and all funding sources should provide stronger development financing and leveraging, (b) the outside of the Gallery looks like crap, and (c) it's in keeping with Market East's historic character.
Which is why I find the "historic" argument by the opposition so ironic and hilarious. Each opposition group repeats the same claim: Market East is a historic district. It is not. It is a smattering of historic buildings (Lits, Strawbridge's, Wanamakers, Reading Terminal, PSFS, etc.) in a fabric largely rebuilt between 1950 and 1980. The (lack of) density of the historic buildings doesn't merit historic district consideration. And furthermore, since so many of these buildings were built with retail in mind, they sported large signs from the very beginning. Robbing them of their signs robs them of their real historic nature and creates a false history, one in keeping with a mentality that the only things in Philadelphia worth keeping were built before 1800.
Market East's history is one of a retail and commercial heart of a city. It is like Boston's Downtown Crossing, New York's Herald Square, Toronto's Dundas Square, San Francisco's Union Square, Chicago's Historic Loop, Minneapolis' Nicollet Mall, London's Piccadilly Circus and Regent Street, and hundreds of other examples globally. Such centers have always been populated as signs as big and fancy as then-current technology allowed. To say otherwise countermands their history.
It is thus unsurprising that the most satisfying intersections on Market East are at 12th and 13th (especially when 1234 had that Dunkin' Donuts billboard in). This is because they are activated, and part of their activation is their signage. The Hard Rock guitar, an incised Marriot sign, the signs for Sole Food and Loews Hotel, the Convention Center, Macy's' display windows...all of this results in the skeleton of some reasonably lively corners. By Market East standards, they're positively tripping.
We must not distract from pedestrian amenities (or their lack thereof). But most the historic assets of Market East have been redeveloped, and further redevelopment needs to happen now on the multitude of underutilized properties (650 Market, the Disney Hole, 910-50 Market, 1000 and 1100 blocks of Market, 1301 Market...) that surround and besiege the historic properties. And to do that as many funding sources as possible must be tapped. Philadelphia's sign ordinance is, when enforced, among the most restrictive in the country. Maybe it's time to concede that, in Market East's case, it's too restrictive, and needs to be relaxed.
Friday, May 20, 2011
Our Retail History
I was a dinner party tonight when I noticed that the silverware was made in Sheffield, England, for John Wanamaker. Sheffield is no longer a manufacturing center and John Wanamaker's ceased to exist twenty years ago. The store is now another downtown Macy's, with far too much office space and far too little retail space.
Nearly all of our most important retail history over the past century--the most iconic brand names--John Wanamaker, Gimbel Brothers, Marshall Field, Filene's, Hecht Brothers, and so forth--have been lost. So many department stores lost...
Nearly all of our most important retail history over the past century--the most iconic brand names--John Wanamaker, Gimbel Brothers, Marshall Field, Filene's, Hecht Brothers, and so forth--have been lost. So many department stores lost...
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