The Definition of Insanity

From Landscape Urbanism and its Discontents, courtesy Envision Baltimore:

Rather than having an urban fabric based on spatial definition by buildings, landscape would be the 'structuring medium.' The 'look and shape of the city' was to be a matter of 'open space within which buildings are set'.

It didn't work the first time; it's not going to work again.

Slumlords

(Please note that this post is the intellectual chassis for some other work.)

Philadelinquency recently ran an excellent piece on how Philadelphia’s very poor school performance holds it back. Setting aside the chicken-and-egg problem of schools and class, let us focus on the final element in this piece, an element that ties back into the blog’s long-standing focus:

Now, about your suburban slumlord who smells the gentrification coming towards his rental property he was renting out for $600/mo and collecting a string of code violations on for a decade who might decide to sell his house to a rehabber and cash out, leaving that rental at the sake of increasing valuations?  Nobody has come up with a solution for that yet.

While this is a tie-in to pieces such as this and this, there is a more fundamental problem it touches on that needs addressing: Our zoning policy has been an abysmal failure at regulating landlords. Worse still, in its zeal to separate out homeowner and renter communities, it has resulted in a nasty unintended consequence: Slumlords are the result of the system.

Consider it for a moment. Time and again, sociological studies have shown that a landlord’s investment in his rental properties is directly tied to his geographical proximity to them. A landlord who lives in the same city is more inclined to invest in his properties than one who does not; in the same neighborhood, even more so; on the same block, ditto; and by far the most likely on premises. Since a slumlord is a landlord who fails to invest in their property, we can extrapolate that they are inversely correlated with distance: that is, the closer to their properties landlords live, the less likely they are to be slumlords. We can thus extrapolate that landlords of city property who live in the exurbs are likely to be slumlords; those who live in a different metro area entirely even more so. And guess what--they are!

It is not by accident that Philadelinquency spends most of its time chasing paper trails on slumlords who live far from the city. And in many cities, “institutional investors” are quite clearly slumlords-in-waiting.

But our claim, that institutional slumlords are an unintended consequence of our land-use policy, goes quite a bit further. To make this argument, let us recall how modern zoning came to be (see here, here, and here); they were implemented precisely because the homeowners of an affluent Cleveland suburb sought to keep renters out. And so it is unsurprising that modern zoning policy disenfranchises renters; what is a bit more surprising is that the jurisprudence required to get around earlier rulings also disenfranchise small landlords. And much as other side effects of “sorting” by use disenfranchised small businesses--to the benefit of larger malls, hypermarkets, and big boxes--so too has it benefited property management firms, and institutional investors.

Property management firms--companies of the type that run garden apartments--have full-time maintenance staff associated with each property. (In the absence of a landlord, a caretaker is the next best thing.) But institutional investors need not; all they need to maintain is the portfolio. Part of this is the--not unreasonable--justification that since they handle smaller properties (i.e. houses) than property managers, a caretaker per property would be excessive. But another part is that these organizations usually have a strong financial focus, often to the detriment to the properties they’re supposed to be managing. And of course, you also have bona fide slumlords who hide behind “institutional investor” masks.

Indeed, the whole system of institutional investing seems set up to encourage financialization and transactions at the expense of property maintenance. Is it any surprise, then, that to many people, “rentals” has become a dogwhistle for “slums”? Or that small rental properties are reflexively opposed, for the same reason development is in general?

One could say that the irony is that the system has come to disadvantage the small landlord, the homeowner who wants to add a granny flat above his garage, the community-minded owner who wants to fix that house up down the street and rent it out to a nice family, in favor of the institutional investor with Wall Street connections and falling-down flats. But that is just one irony buried in a whole system of deeper ironies. Perhaps it’s time to stand up and take notice.

My Train Of Thought Is Going Over Wind Gap, Apparently

Saw this item on Systemic Failure the other day: http://systemicfailure.wordpress.com/2014/02/24/vre-replaces-apartments-with-parking/

Progress on acquiring land in the Crossroads Business Park for the 1,500-space parking lot at the planned station is moving along more slowly. Officials had originally expected the station to be open by now, but numerous issues have popped up, with the most recent problems caused by stalled negotiations for land for the commuter parking lot.

The county had been negotiating with businessmen George Lester and Fitz Johnson, who own the property needed for VRE parking. The businessmen recently gained county approval to build 610 apartment units and commercial space next to the station site.

But the negotiations for the roughly 25 acres for the parking lot have proven fruitless. So the county recently asked the Virginia Department of Transportation to handle the property acquisition.

“They can facilitate it better,” said Spotsylvania County Administrator Doug Barnes. 

Ya think? And what's worse, there are plenty of excellent examples where it's Done Right nearby--in Arlington County, in fact.

But there is another issue buried between the lines here. 610 apartment units on a 25 acre site comes out to 24.4 units/acre. Let us simplify this to 24 u/acr, and consider that postwar "garden" apartment "barracks" are really just attached rows of duplexes or triplexes in "green" settings*. At 24 u/acr, you get (a) 12 dp/acr, or 1 duplex = 1/12 acr, and (b) 8 tp/acr, or 1 triplex = 1/8 acr. Triplexes cover less space, yielding more green space, so this complex would probably be triplexes.

Let us, by contrast, begin with the typical 25'x50' lot found in prewar suburbia, remembering of course the dictum that there is no difference between New Urbanism and prewar suburbanism. Since an acre is slightly greater than 200'x200', this implies that there are 32 lots/acre; triplexing this yields 96 u/acr, or twelve times the density of what is currently being achieved. But this is excessively dense; most railroad suburbs have emergent 50/50 homeownership/rental ratios.

Let us reserve, in line with typical consumption, 20% of our site (5 acres) for infrastructure--streets, a park, and the like. This yields 640 lots on a 25-acre site. Splitting these lots evenly, we have 320 houses and 320 plexes. Splitting the plexes evenly yields 160 duplexes and another 160 triplexes**. Summing these yields 1920 units, a whopping 315% more than the current proposal calls for. And furthermore, neighborhoods built out to this density are often just as green, and charming, as those with more green space. This implies that, past a certain amount, provision of green space is subject to diminishing returns: Just before you hit it, you get charming "green" town environments; past it, house farms.

So provision of green space is clearly not a good in and of itself. Like most anything else, it's how it's used that determines its true value. Green scraps left to fulfill zoning requirements have marginal development value and zero usage value. But modernist planning, in its flawed assertion that green space is an unmitigated good, makes no account of this. This is why house farms and towers-in-parks both tend to have the same overengineered, lawn-softened, bleakly industrial look: They are both people batteries. And because urban dynamics requires a critical mass to spark, while the lawns hide their interiors' aesthetic bleakness, they also push everything too damn far apart to spark emergent urban dynamics.

Anyway. Since the average household size today is 2.6, our 25-acre railroad suburb would yield a population of ~5000, a much fatter prize than the ~1600 the garden apartments would house, and certainly a far fatter prize than a 1500 space lot. Three other similar developments nearby would yield a nice town of 20k on 100 acres...

Modeling, the fact that, past a certain critical point, green space appears to cease to boost urbanism, and indeed, instead diminishes it needs to be considered mathematically. This critical point appears to be tied to an urbanism "critical mass". Since critical masses imply step functions, we can infer Heaviside (either it is or isn't), and can also infer that that function's discontinuity occurs at a certain percentage of green space provision. Since green space provision, by percentage, is (obviously) along the origin from (0,0) to (100,100), all we need to find is at what value green space provision, by lot, definitively hurts the formation of urban dynamics. This implies a Heaviside step from 1 (urbanism is emergent) to 0 (it is not).

Urbanism also has a clear financial buff. We need to find the nature of this buff (is it scalar? vector? etc.) and model it; knowing this information can help develop key Strong Towns tools that are not just descriptive, but predictive as well.
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*By stacking, not by firewalls. By firewalls, you can get du-, tri-, quad-, and hex- (6) plexes. Quadplexes by stacking (octoplexes, or 8 units, per firewall) are rare, but not unheard of; pentaplexes (5 units) by stacking and their decaplex (10 units) cousins by firewall are absent--most likely because elevator regulations start kicking in at that point.
**There are a couple of reasons for doing this. First off, different space requirements. Duplexes have more living area than triplexes in a unit shell. Secondly, this yields a Main Street of duplexes atop commercial units. But it is unreasonable to think the Main Street would consume all of the allotted duplexes.

Macro Mistakes

Like any good dogmatist, Hayek recently disparaged Keynes. Yet he without sin casts the first stone: perhaps he should try and clean his own house first. It was precisely those qualities Hayek disparaged Keynes for that made Keynes a good economist.

The fact of the matter is that economics as a discipline has advanced little since Smith's The Wealth of Nations, and the person who singlehandedly offered the most advancement was, in fact, Keynes. This is not to say he was all right--indeed, as Jane Jacobs points out, Keynesianism's  principal quantitative instrument, the Phillips curve, had begun to fail as early as 1967,* and his economic corpus left no theory adequately explaining the onset of stagflation a decade thereafter. But when Keynes, a trained mathematician, turned his eye to economics, the field had already rotted away from a century or more of disciplinary decadence, laid bare by the Great Depression's onset. In short, Keynes was a talent in one field who turned his attention to an adjacent one--the paragon of an innovator.

This is not to defend post-1970s neo-Keynesians. Despite the volley between them, the Austrians, and the latter's successor neoclassicals, none of them have offered any real solutions, and all of them have offered a mix of rehashed masters' theories, bullshit, and (in very rare moments of clarity) insights. Nor has the neoclassical's fixation on mathematical modeling helped: many of their "sophisticated" models are actually very elementary, almost childish, applications of iterated operations. And anyway, a model is like a program, and as the programmers like to say, "Garbage in, garbage out".

Perhaps nuggets of wisdom can be found in neoclassicals' pesudomathematical clutter, but so much of the discipline is fundamentally deficient that no matter how mathematically accurate the models may be, they will never return anything more than garbage. Something is rotten in the state of Denmark. Stagflation laid this bare; it was papered over; 2008 laid it bare again. Jacobs offered the single most accurate critique of the economics of her day in 1984; for a generation, it has been ignored. But sooner or later, the reckoning must come, and when it does, I hope that the offer below does some good.

Some Major Fallacies and Other Rational Lapses

Hayek's Fallacy. This one is named after Friedrich Hayek, doyen of the Austrian School. Hayek is credited for several important insights--but this fallacy is closely tied to his realization that economics is both a complex and self-organizing system. More a philosopher at heart, Hayek found himself without the wherewithal to deal with the problems at hand, and much of his work is thus a demonstration of the limits of qualitative analysis in economics. But the real issue comes--and this is why the neoclassicals break from the Austrian School--when Hayek, whose work lies at the very edge of qualitative reasoning's capabilities, becomes suspicious of those attempting to find and apply mathematical instruments to the problems at hand.

Basically, Hayek's Fallacy amounts to an economist (or a scientist of any sort) doing one of two things: either (a) throwing one's hands up in the air and saying "I give up!" when faced with the understanding that a system is too complex to easily be soluble (or at least tamable), and/or (b) embracing that complexity as a thing-in-itself instead of further teasing it apart, finding the internal feedbacks, etc.

For example, a thinker, when faced with the realization that System A is a integrated dynamic agglutinated supersystem over System B, engages in Hayek's Fallacy if he fails to further attempt to find the underlying integrations and agglutinations, or tease apart its dynamics. In rhetoric, Hayek's Fallacy can function as a call-to-arms, a statement that a problem is too big for one mind to solve; it, however, has no place in academic literature.

Smith's Mistake, or, The Anthropological Fallacy. This is the fallacious conflation of nation and state in economic literature. Recall that the definition of a nation is "a people, race, or tribe; those having the same descent, language, and history," whereas a state, in all of its forms, is simply a statement of political sovereignty.

As Jacobs put it, "[Smith] accepted without comment the mercantilist tautology that nations are the salient entities for understanding the structure of economic life"**. But this very tautology is a confusion between "nation" and "state", brought about by a misreading of the special case of Enlightenment Europe. She herself sidesteps this issue: nation in Cities and the Wealth of Nations is actually used in contexts that imply "state" (as it is in Smith's work), and is indeed often paired with "sovereignty".

This confusion has never adequately been addressed in the literature, which is a shame really, because The Wealth of Nations is actually exactly what it says on the tin ... at least until Smith starts discussing issues that apply to the state, not the nation. But the sovereign macroeconomics*** it supports is thus, by definition, a very small subclass of sovereignties--nation-states.

How many of them can you name? In fact, even some of the strongest candidates for nation-statehood, like France, constitute cultural empires^: France includes France proper, Brittany, Languedoc except for the part of Savoy that ended up in Italy, about half the Basque Country, part of the Rhineland aka Alsace, and possibly a little tiny part of Catalonia that ended up on the wrong side of the Pyrenées. About half Germany's Länder are little tiny nation-statelets. Ignoring Northern Ireland, the UK has about half a dozen nations: Scotland, Wales, Cornwall, the Isle of Man, and at least two distinct Englands. Spain includes the nations of Aragon, Andalusia, Castile, Catalonia, Galicia (which is really a northern extension of Portugal), and the other half of Basque Country. Venice, Milan, Genoa, Florence, Rome, Naples, and Palermo are all culturally very different places, anchoring very different places. And so on. So even on a continent where the political boundaries come closest to matching nation-states, they rarely ever are. What do you think this implies for truly large states?

The Energy Golden Calf. A faulty premise underlying a great deal of modern macroeconomics. It is often claimed that, due to the advancement of our economy, energy inputs have decoupled. Not just utter bullshit--the fact that energy crises can be shown to underlie both the 1970s and 2008 recessions alone should tell us as much--but dangerously ethnocentric, to boot.

Funny Money. This is the idea that modern monetary theory (much of it based on fiat currency) has solved everything. In reality, it ignores the underlying problem--limits to growth, particularly viz. debt's role in demanding growth--and allows us to, instead of solving these very real problems, paper them over with nice-sounding bullshit like the Energy Golden Calf or the idea that Bakken and Eagle Ford will make us energy-independent.

While gold bugs are mistaken in holding a metal's value sacrosanct (the natural conclusion of this post is that there is a very real natural money base, and it ain't metal), the fact that they dare question Funny Money dogma--one that especially pervades finance--deserves some credit in and of itself.

Politics Overassignment. An outgrowth of the failure to fix Smith's Mistake, the belief that the sovereign state is the arbiter of macroeconomics often leads economists of all types to assign outsize roles to these entities' politics. But the point of Smith's Mistake is that the sovereign state is not macroeconomics' arbiter! Why, then, should its politics be anything but tangential to (if not a derivative of) its economic well-being?

I have a "razor", a corollary of this mistake. In any given explanation of an economic phenomenon, the one that utilizes politics the least is usually the correct one.

Major Unaddressed Problems

The Growth Problem. Nearly everything in economics is predicated on infinite growth. As any hard scientist will tell you, however, nothing is. This core problem, ignored in most schools of thought, and aggressively denied and papered over in the few that even consider it, refers to the need to reconcile economic health and well-being with an environment that is less than tolerant of infinite growth. This issue manifests in several tight-knit issues:

• The Debt Problem. A simple explanation of debt is a good advanced now, paid back later. It, in other words, adds a temporal element, a half a dimension, to the system. The problem is that, in the financial system that has supported the industrial economy, debt is advanced only with interest: Not just an advance in the now, but pay back with a little extra later. Growth is required to pay that little extra--or--Interest demands growth. But since it is precisely this interest which grows the money supply, this implies that Money demands growth. The inescapable conclusion of this is that due to its debt-and-interest foundation, money is not resilient to a lack of growth, and hence unsustainable. But debt is required in any healthy economy, growth or not! This in turn demands that (a) the money base be removed from the debt base, and (b) the debt base managed so that it does not overshoot its limits. Current economic theory is blind on the latter--infinite growth is orthodoxy--and hence fails to understand the underlying issues that enforce the former.
• The Energy Problem. Energy is the key economic input. Without energy, an economy can't function. While the Energy Golden Calf and Funny Money chronicle the fallacious attempt at decoupling it, it is a certainty that a world with limits is going to have to deal with the this issue sooner or later.
• The Economic Health Problem. If a healthy economy is predicated on infinite growth, how can one with no growth be achieved? And second, if it is possible to have a healthy economy without meaningful growth, how would it have the most equitable distribution of goods?

The Imperial Problem. Pursuant to Smith's Mistake and its attendant Politics Overassignment, the dominant issue in the branch of macroeconomics that focuses on states--sovereign macroeconomics***. While urban, regional, and national economics are relatively well explained, Smith's Mistake has left a key problem with moving from a national level to a state one unanswered. This problem is: How do imperial economies actually behave? For sovereign macroeconomics to have any real meaning, and any real policy input, answering this question is key, as nearly every sovereign entity is an empire^, and while Jacobs offers significant explanatory inroads, her city-and-region focus would need to be scaled up to find relevant causal and feedback relationships.

The National Problem. The second largest outstanding problem in sovereign macroeconomics. Briefly stated: Stripping away statist elements, Smith's is an excellent account of the economies of nations; Jacobs complements that with one of cities and regions. It appears fairly evident that a nation without economic centralization--that is, a single major economic hub aka a large city--is a bypassed place^^--but this demands the questions: If cities and regions, and nations are both well-described, then how exactly does a city and region economy give rise to a national one? And if bypassed places are nations that never developed cities, what causes the catalyzing feedback to fail?

The Markets Problem. The role of the market is paramount in economics. Economists of various schools assign various values to this role, but they all assign a value to it. But it can clearly be seen that, while the market provides for the optimal allocation of resources in most instances, it fails to in at least two types of (related) cases: the tragedy of the commons, and Braess's Paradox. Both of these involve optimal decisions at the individual level--the level of markets--resulting in suboptimal outcomes at the communal level--the level of government. Thus it can be seen that, contra certain schools of economic thought, markets can and often do fail as optimizing mechanisms. The problem is hence: Can we identify which venues markets fail to optimize for? If so, are optimal solutions understood? Can we implement optimal solutions (e.g. with policy)? and finally, Can we build an economic theory that accounts for both when markets are successful and when they are failures? Understanding markets limits is the heart of the Markets Problem^^^.

Conclusion

Between the plethora of lapses in thought and problems blinkered dogma leaves unpondered, is it any wonder that the field of economics is becoming ever more marginalized, much of its previous sway now being intruded on by mathematicians whose models are orders of magnitude more sophisticated, or by finance majors handling Wall Street administration? The field is a flailing colossus, its own extreme disciplinary decadence eating away at it from the inside, its fortified silos and walls refracting fresh innovations and insights from the outside like so much enemy artillery.

Despite its PR'd veneer, its inside has become laughable, worse than pseudoscience--a series of entrenched, never-changing dogmatic positions sniping away at each other and disregarding any fresh insight any Other has to offer. It calling itself the "hardest" soft science is worse than a bad joke: The tripe coming out of economics builds mental blocks against insights from other soft sciences (particularly history and anthropology) and plays an outsize role in the soft sciences' marginalization as a whole. Economics is a cancer in our midst.

And the blogosphere has laid it bare! Before, the walls of academia hid it; today, however, half the economics blogs consist of Keynesians sniping at Austrians, and the other half Austrians sniping at Keynesians, both sides regarding the other with the sort of undisguised contempt you rarely ever see outside of crusaders and jihadists (really the same thing). Then they prognosticate with pearls of wisdom from their masters, and when they invariably turn out, in some way, wrong, spin and backfill them. Blogs like Naked Capitalism and Zero Hedge are good for lots of things, but--just like their discipline--are failures in their stated purpose. It is hard to have any sort of productive discussion with economists, or even economics attachés, when the discipline's core is so riddled with errors, and the practitioners so inflexibly defensive, that gentle prodding only ever yields being shouted out.

Is it any wonder I find engineering more accessible?

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*Cities and the Wealth of Nations, Ch. 1, pp. 17-20.

**ibid., Ch. 2, p. 50.

***That is, macroeconomics at the sovereign-state level.

^Here I am using a very "tight" definition, where an empire means any state that encompasses two or more whole nations. States we often think of as empires can be thought of as large empires, with ten or more constituent nations. The United States, for example, has about a dozen major nations.

By the way, Europe isn't devoid of nation-states. Off the top of my head: Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Baltic States, Finland, Scandinavia, Iceland, Portugal, and Malta are all, for all intents and purposes, nation-states.

^^ibid., Ch. 9, pp. 124-34.

^^^I'd like to further note that solving the Markets Problem might be the single most important contribution economics has to adapting to a world without limits. Growth dogma assumes there is always more out there, but as is regularly pointed out, this is fallacy. Instead a real solution of the Markets Problem would (should) entail a solution to this question: How do we tap common resources in such a way that we always leave an adequate amount for those who follow? Back at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, such a question would have been nonsensical; today, it's a requirement.

Urban Design Must Be Becoming Mainstream...

...because once something becomes mainstream, it's going to be perverted, and Jannie Blackwell's proposal is about as extreme a perversion of urban design as it gets...

...using urban design as a tool to prevent any redevelopment on any property whatsoever without getting a variance.

Locust Street Connection

This is an outrage.

So a legally-mandated bridge crossing that has been in the works for three years and was designed with a lot of community involvement (I should know, I voted on the design myself) is being held up by a bunch of idiots who remained willfully ignorant. They are complaining that it will (a) destroy "mature shade trees" and (b) destroy their belovèd dog park.

I don't call trees planted in 1980 "mature shade trees". And, while the current dog park will be out of action for a little over a year, a decent alternative will be provided. Look at the site plan! And furthermore, after construction, the dog park will reopen bigger and better than ever. It's a win-win for everybody.

So shame on you, Fitler Square dog owners who couldn't be bothered to inform themselves for 156.5 weeks that their park would be temporarily modified for a legally-mandated bridge project. And especially shame on you, Damon Roberts, City Council also-ran, for demonstrating that you are incompetent for the job: it is a Councilman's job to know what public projects are happening in their district, and the fact you are filing suit demonstrates that you did not. You have lost my vote now and forevermore.

I can only hope that whichever judge this asinine case goes in front of laughs it out of court. This is a suit they cannot win. This will only cause a delay--and a delay means a wastage of public funds. Thank you for wasting our tax money, Damon Roberts. You truly do not deserve an elected position of any kind.

Tell the Friends of the Schuylkill River Park to call Damon Roberts out here.

Tea Party Urban Planning Pt II

 Planetizen got wind of the California Tea Party group actively "engaged" in land-use planning. A few posts ago, I criticized the group's approach, and used this criticism to demonstrate my critique that the Tea Party is really just a bunch of hypocrites using a warped version of libertarianism as cover for retention of a faltering status quo.

The Tea Party isn't really libertarian in nature. The California group demonstrates this to a T: their primary focus is in preserving the "entitlements" they've grown used to...a large house with a large lawn and a car for each parent, each of their 2.3 children, and possibly their pet(s) too. There's nothing wrong* with this as a lifestyle choice, but to the Tea Partiers, it has been warped into a God-given right that every red-white-and-blue-bleeding American needs to have. What if otherwise reasonable people, like you or I, don't want it? Well, tough balls.

But you see, there's the rub. That's not choice. And without choice, you can't have freedom. "Freedom Is Slavery" is really a right and proper motto for these Tea Partiers, for a "freedom" without choice is a false freedom--a slavery. And that segues into the ultimate irony: this position is the antithesis of the libertarian ideology. That's right: the Tea Party is to libertarianism as al-Qaeda is to Sunni Islam, or televangelism to mainstream Christianity. It's a warped, perverted, obnoxious fringe view so secure in the dogmatization of its entitlements that it can't see there's another way of doing things, and one that may well be better in the long run.

By contrast, libertarianism really is about choice. If these Tea Partiers really were at all libertarian, no matter what their opinions on the planning effort may be, there's one thing they should unconditionally support: road privatization. But they don't, and they won't, because doing so exposes many of the hidden costs of suburban living currently just subsidized away. They don't want a balanced playing field, or real choice, or freedom: they just want to put blinders on and have things stay the way they are.

But the world is changing around them, and that ain't gonna happen.
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* Well, other than the insane social, sociological, psychological, cultural, and ecological costs, of course.

Tea Party Urban Planning? Bad for America!

Found this article on the intertubez (thanks Urban Planning Blog). Here's a choice excerpt:

When planners asked audience members to rank the importance of open space like parks, Gass exploded. “Open space also includes people’s private property,” she said. “You cannot ask people to vote on something that violates others’ private property.”

Lou Hexter, who was leading the exercise, tried to placate her, saying quietly, “It’s good to hear everyone’s opinion, but we need to ——.”

“Back off!” Gass yelled.

To the Tea Party, a lawn counts as open space? I smell something rotten.

Lawns in the United States come about as a result of setback requirements. That is, the zoning code mandates that a structure on a property be set so-and-so feet from the street, from the sides, and from the rear. Philadelphia's R1 zone, for example, requires 65% "open space" on the lot via these setbacks. That is, the lawns are regulated in.

This is manifestly at odds with the Tea Party's self-proclaimed less-regulation ethos. But it is in keeping with Tea Partiers' actions. This "movement" is really a hypocrisy on a grand scale: it uses far-rightist ideology to promulgate the current status quo--at all costs. Scott Walker, despite the truth of rising gas prices, elects to spend money on idiotic and shakily justified road-widening projects while rejecting guaranteed monies for improved rail service--remembering that what passes for rail service in most of the U.S. would be considered barely rudimentary anywhere else in the developed world. Christie axes ARC (a political decision whose legal ramifications will haunt him the rest of his career) in favor of bailing out troubled and ever-incomplete Meadowlands Xanadu, or whatever they're calling it now--a shopping mall whose success in an era when shopping malls are seen as passé is dubious at best. Florida nixes high-speed rail (again). And these ideological vultures are circling Calfornia's incipient system.

Tea Partiers see driving as "freedom" and trains as "socialism". But I have news for them: the Interstates are socialist! They are a public commons in this country, but elsewhere in the world (France) they are privately tolled and operated. They are private. And how much public transportation money do we spend on them? The system is 99.9% complete (there is a section in Mississippi which was never finished) and so any road widenings or new proposals on the Interstates are done for one reason and one reason only: to promote sprawl, as defined by the overly-restrictive, overly-regulated land-use planning of most suburban municipalities. But demand for this sprawl died in 2007 and it ain't coming back.

It is an irony that California Tea Partiers are, instead of de-regulating our built environment, thereby making development more flexible, implicitly assuming our over-regulation status quo as an ultimate good, and continuing this over-regulation, due to their own narrow view of what a home should be. But the market is fighting this regulation--and so the Tea Partiers are fighting the market. Libertarian ethos elevates the market to apotheosis: to libertarians, the market is sacred, and must not be fought. So the Californian Tea Partiers have discarded libertarianism: through their actions, they prove they are not libertarian.

It is unsurprising, however, when one considers the cultural underpinnings of the Tea Party. Narrowness and dogma in thought produce narrowness and dogma in politics and policy. Intellectual justifications, to this anti-intellectual subculture, are just a game of smoke and mirrors. But the Tea Party's influence far exceeds their actual numbers, and in any event, its message is antithetical to Generation Y. It's at its obstinate, obstructionist apogee, and as it becomes forced to define itself by actions and not just words--we see these actions and we don't like what we see.

Which is why the end of this article brings me such a nod of grim relief:

Even with the group of vocal critics, when the audience voted on priorities for the Bay Area, the top five were: daily needs close to home, clean air, convenient access to jobs, water conservation and lower carbon emissions. “Large homes with big yards” was near the bottom.

The words flash onto a black screen: “The ‘New World Order’ is here.” Dramatic music swells as the message continues: “One Global Vision, Designed by the United Nations, To Strip you of Your Freedom.”
What could be so sinister? According to the video posted on the East Bay Tea Party’s website, it’s the Sustainable Communities Strategy being developed by two of the wonkiest governmental bodies in the Bay Area: the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and the Association of Bay Area Governments.

Source: The Bay Citizen (http://s.tt/12whC)

The words flash onto a black screen: “The ‘New World Order’ is here.” Dramatic music swells as the message continues: “One Global Vision, Designed by the United Nations, To Strip you of Your Freedom.”
What could be so sinister? According to the video posted on the East Bay Tea Party’s website, it’s the Sustainable Communities Strategy being developed by two of the wonkiest governmental bodies in the Bay Area: the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and the Association of Bay Area Governments.

Source: The Bay Citizen (http://s.tt/12whC)

Drop DROP

I'm sleepy now, but here's an excellent summation of the DROP controversy.

Despite months of controversy, Council President Anna C. Verna - who at least bowed to political reality by scrapping her own reelection as she prepares to collect a $585,000 DROP check - put off grappling with the program until after the decisive May primary. During the campaign, unions representing police, firefighters, and other city workers demanded candidates pledge fealty to DROP, as most Council hopefuls did.

Now that the dust has settled, with Democratic nominees confident of reelection, Council could do the responsible thing and scuttle the retirement program. Voters made clear their disgust by spurning reelection bids by two political stalwarts enrolled in DROP: Councilman Frank Rizzo and City Commissioner Marge Tartaglione.

DROP serves no legitimate management purpose. More important, a city facing one budget nightmare after another - with schools being the crisis du jour - simply cannot afford to sweeten the regular pensions due to retiring city employees. Finally, there is no scenario under which incumbent elected officials should be able to take advantage of such a perk. 

Council members who really want to move the city forward need to face up to the fact that it's time for a clean break. Drop DROP.

 Today's Philadelphia City Council: A body of contentedly corrupt politicians who don't even recognize their corruption. No DROP-enrolled politician in any competitive race stands a chance of winning. Just by making some noncompetitive races competitive, we can further get rid of this cancer on our city's finances.

Soon to be written: a discussion of what demographic shifts mean for Council districts and what each district will likely do to maximize incumbent strength.