Showing posts with label Michael Noda. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Michael Noda. Show all posts

Friday, August 7, 2015

Looking At High Speed in the Keystone Corridor

The Keystone Service is a quiet giant. A simple, more-or-less hourly regional train, it only takes an hour to get from Philadelphia to Lancaster and a bit more to Harrisburg. It also adds extra hourly trains on the most-heavily-traveled intercity railroad in North America: the Northeast Corridor between Philadelphia and New York.

It does all of this through simple, done-under-the-radar improvement of the old Pennsylvania Railroad mainline between Philadelphia and Harrisburg to 110 mph running.

Right now, Harrisburg is where improvements end, though. This is not an accident. While Norfolk Southern bypasses the former PRR mainline east of the Susquehanna, it uses it -- intensively -- to Pittsburgh. Electrification, and therefore the territory Keystone Service push-pulls can cover, also ends at Harrisburg. And finally, the terrain becomes significantly more mountainous, and the railroad more curvy, as it follows the Juniata River valley deep into core Appalachia's corduroy, up and across the Alleghenies, and back down the Conemaugh River valley.

As it stands, with more operating funds (i.e. enough to purchase a couple of trainsets, engineers, conductors, and slots) integrating a few more daily trains between Harrisburg and Pittsburgh appears perfectly viable. A push-pull setup with an electric at one end and a diesel at the other would also allow these runs to be integrated into the Keystone's existing schedule. And there is the tantalizing possibility of night trains, which Sic Transit Philadelphia discussed a couple of years ago.

And, with relatively simple improvements (bringing back the fourth track, increasing superelevation on the passenger tracks) speed can be brought up for passenger runs, making them more competitive than the Daily Pennsylvanian's current 45 mph average speed.

But that's all for regional trains using the classic track to access the hill towns, towns which have relatively high ridership due to (a) the trains arriving in the afternoon and (b) a general lack of Interstate/freeway competition in the area.* Good regional service is important, but Pittsburgh is a large city and therefore a large travel market; it sits at the crossroads of the Northeast and Midwest; if Pennsylvania wants to compete with New York's Water Level Route and get a slice of that pie for themselves, it's going to need a new passenger route built to significantly more modern standards than the old PRR line.

Through the corduroy mountains.

Keystone West

Approaching the Problem

If Keystone East is an experiment, it's one of the most successful in all of American passenger railroading. It established not only the existence of a rail travel market from a larger city to smaller ones out in its hinterland, it also established that high ridership is a function both of frequent service and a reasonable fare.

But it is also an experiment abetted by advantageous geography and the civil engineering prowess of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and when the PRR electrified their Northeast Corridor in the 1930s, the Main Line section only went to Harrisburg and Enola. Plans to electrify the Middle Division, the section through the mountains to Pittsburgh, were discussed, but came to naught with postwar dieselization.

It's also arguable Harrisburg and Lancaster play outsize cultural roles in the state. Lancaster is, after all, its eponymous county's seat and the heart and cultural center of Pennsylvania Dutch Country (there's a reason Turkey Hill's motto is "Imported from Lancaster County"!) Harrisburg is the state capital ... not much more needs to be said.

Head east down the PRR mainline from Pittsburgh and the same opportunities don't present themselves. Johnstown and Altoona are fair-sized burghs,* yes, but one data-lite argument that can be made is that the relatively greater importance of Keystone East would naturally drive a higher ridership than a similar service profile on Keystone West.

I don't buy this argument. Not because I think population doesn't matter -- it obviously does; more people means more potential riders -- but rather because it attempts to explain a particular result a particular political class doesn't like by avoiding having to deal with, you know, actual data and competent modeling. Data-lite arguments often tend to carry exceptionalist undertones, too, seeking ways any result can be construed as a "special case" instead of looking for commonalities to build generalizations. Alan Garfinkel had a thing or two to say about that kind of reasoning.

All that said, however, it is clearly not easy to get from Harrisburg west. But it may be easier than often given credit for.
The West Side

The cost of building a new line, as J. Edgar Thomson appreciated when he engineered the PRR's mainline, is a function both of its length and the relative difficulty of its construction. Length scales linearly, difficulty exponentially. This is why he decided to concentrate nearly all of the mainline's most challenging features in one spot: between Altoona and the Conemaugh River's water gaps through Laurel and Chestnut ridges to the west of Johnstown. East of Altoona, the line follows the water level route of the Juniata River; west of Chestnut Ridge, the mainline crosses the Allegheny Plateau while a low-grade freight line follows the Conemaugh down to the Kiskimentas and eventually Allegheny rivers.

Norfolk Southern currently runs heavy eastbound (uphill) trains up the Conemaugh Line and lighter eastbound and all westbound traffic along the mainline. The lines rejoin by Heinz Stadium in Pittsburgh and pretty much anything that isn't a unit train's going to originate or terminate in Conway Yard a few miles down the Ohio. This is a traffic pattern of convenience, though: were there heavier passenger service in the Pittsburgh area, the Conemaugh Line would be able (by double-tracking it again and upgrading the signaling) to bypass most of it.

What I'm getting at here is that, from Pittsburgh all the way to Conpit Jct., where the mainline and Conemaugh Line meet, it's perfectly possible to convert the mainline to a passenger line. Which is useful, seeing how it's a natural commuter and regional rail route. It also offers a useful terminus for a fast passenger route through the mountains at Latrobe, a burgh sitting snugly at the foot of Chestnut Ridge, and where the line curves from following the ridgeline and instead heads directly west.

Like Keystone East, this "Keystone West" uses the PRR's civil engineering prowess to its advantage, upgrading an existing line to high-speed standard. It also offers an easy commuter rail corridor extending from Pittsburgh either to Greensburg, Latrobe, or Johnstown, along with improved regional services along the classic corridor.

This latter is necessary because a high-speed bypass through Appalachia's Ridge and Valley province must be just that -- a bypass. Like all trellis river systems, the Juniata curves too sharply as it crosses from water gap to water gap to be useful for faster travel. Instead, the Keystone Corridor's new middle division must punch through the mountains on an extremely low-curvature corridor.
________________
* The Pennsylvania Turnpike (I-76) runs well south, along the former South Penn RR right-of-way; I-80 runs well north, and if it could avoid trees along with everything else in these parts, it probably would, too.

** The combined population of Harrisburg (49,673) and Lancaster (59,322) is 108,995; their MSA's, better for intercity planning, are 509,074 and 507,766 for 1,016,840. For Johnstown (20,978, 140,499) and Altoona (46,320, 127,089), that's 67,298 and 267,588.

Monday, March 18, 2013

The Outsize Value of Fare Coordination

or, why NPT and the Freedom Card need to be compatible

a working paper à la Nate Hood

"Organization before electronics before concrete" is an important German concept that refers to both a means of subdividing solutions and a philosophy for applying those subdivisions. The best solutions have the most impact for the money, after all, and the ones that have the most impact are generally those that cost the least to implement properly. Note adverb: Cheapskate "solutions" generally tend to fail. Since we are looking at proper solutions, and it follows that those with the highest cost-benefit ratios tend to be optimal in any circumstance, this means that "organizational" solutions, with an extremely low capital cost* relative to benefits. Because of this, fare coordination is an essential organizational problem, and one which, when implemented properly, contributes massively to systemwide user-friendliness.

This can be directly applied to SEPTA's NPT travails. User desires for NPT are fairly simple--one card to get where you're going, no matter on what or when. One card for any train to Trenton, Wilmington, Downingtown. One card that connects to PATCO and the River Line. One card that does it all. London's Oyster system is a template.

Why is it so hard to just follow a goddamn template?

SEPTA's working protocol for NPT is generally commendable: contactless, open-loop, easily integrated with next-gen credit and debit cards^ like Tokyo's Suica as well as other next-gen fare systems. But that's where its technical edge comes to an end: NPT is attempting an (untested) rollout of Regional Rail fare payment that is not at all in accord with the best templates (e.g. Oyster, which uses a modified proof-of-payment system)--something which I'm sure Sic Transit Philadelphia will give more info on in the near future--and a total failure to integrate the Freedom Card. To hell with fare coordination! sayeth 1234 Market. We want to protect our agency turf at all costs!

Integrating the Freedom Card is basic fare coordination. While it may be more limited than what SEPTA has in mind with NPT, it is not so limited as needing to be back-compatible with tokens. Like what NPT will be, the Freedom Card is also contactless, chip card-based, credit- and debit-card-integrated. It already has features SEPTA has in mind, and was designed to be open-ended enough to be compatible with NPT, predictable since NPT itself is something that has been kicked around for the better part of a decade now. It is Universal Gravitation to NPT's General Relativity. Any implementation of NPT in a fixed-fare environment (buses, trolleys, the subway, el, and NHSL) is going to act, technically, in the same manner as the Freedom Card. So take it as the technical base, and build a variable-fare system on top that works like the Oyster Card! Or, at the very least, make sure it has basic back-compatibility--something that all software developers know full well. It is not hard.

And the users will thank SEPTA. Suddenly, instead of having several agencies at cross-purposes with one another, and discrete fare payment media to match, a single card becomes a gateway to the region. Want to visit the Mercer Museum? No problem! Want to visit a friend in Burlington? No problem! Want to check out that trendy place that just opened in Haddonfield? No problem! It is because, once implemented, fare coordination provides these real, tangible user benefits that even the handful of primitive fare coordination systems in use in the U.S. are expansionary--the Clipper Card, growing at a rate of two agencies a year, for example, or the SmarTrip/CharmCard nexus, which has effectively tied together a fare-coordination network spanning two major cities (Baltimore and D.C.) and the better part of two states. It is because of this that there is only one fare media--the OV-Chipkaart--in use anywhere in the Netherlands. Build a core and other agencies (especially smaller ones which see more significant boosts) will want to climb on.

The point is that while more advanced fare payment systems are more advantageous to the transit agency, fare coordination is more advantageous to the user. And user advantageousness is what, frankly, makes or breaks borderline users, what drives ridership up--or down. SEPTA is not so large as to serve the entire Philadelphia region the way the MBTA is to Boston. If SEPTA truly wishes to make getting around the region using its services advantageous, it must make sure its connections with the regions' other agencies are also advantageous to the user. It must invest in fare coordination.

Unfortunately, it says a great deal about American mass transit that agencies here are obsessed not with implementing proven, and working, templates, but rather with inventing new "standards" that are optimized for themselves and themselves alone (and thus not really standards). All SEPTA has to do with NPT is implement an Oyster Card clone**. Alas, if they keep on the course they're going, they're going to botch it.
____________
* Organizational solutions usually also have relatively high human cost, because the nature of such solutions is that they require agency cooperation and/or integration, a difficult proposition in the U.S. environment where agency turf issues rule the roost. Regulation--requiring all agencies serving a particular metropolitan area to be fare-coordinated--may be a useful workaround, but on the other hand the integration of fare payment media with credit cards (already happening in Europe and Japan^) may well render the whole fare-coordination issue obsolete.
^ For example, D.C., where the SmarTrip system (itself compatible with MTA's CharmCard) is about to be phased out for a credit card-based payment system.
** See e.g. the YouTube link above for why.